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The U.S.- China trade war: tariff data
and general equilibrium analysis
By Minghao Li,a Edward J. Balistrerib and Wendong Zhangc
The current trade war between the United States and China is unprecedented in
modern history. This study introduces a database of tariff increases resulting from
the recent trade war and quantifies the impacts using the canonical GTAPinGAMS
model calibrated to the recently released GTAP version 10 accounts. We find that the
tariff increases as of September 2019 decrease welfare in China by 1.9% and welfare
in the U.S. by 0.3%. Impacts on sectoral revenue are reported for both countries.
China’s exports to and imports from the United States are reduced by 58.3% and
50.7%. Most of the reductions in bilateral trade are absorbed by trade diversion to
other countries. The welfare and U.S.-China bilateral trade impacts are exacerbated
by additional tariffs threatened by the United States and corresponding retaliations
from China. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by increasing and decreasing import
substitution (Armington) elasticities by two standard deviations. This has modest
impacts on welfare and trade flow results.
JEL codes: F11, F12, F17
1. Introduction
The years 2018 and 2019 witnessed the largest trade war in modern history. In
early 2018, the United States invoked Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (alleging a national security threat) to increase tariffs on steel and aluminum
products, which started U.S. trade disputes with major steel and aluminum ex-
porters including China. Some of these disputes, such as those between the U.S.
and Canada and Mexico, have already been resolved through negotiations. In
the meantime, U.S. trade disputes with China have quickly evolved into a full-
blown trade war. After Section 301 (unfair trade) investigations, the United States
a Corresponding Author: Economics, Applied Statistics and International Business De-
partment, New Mexico State University, 212 Domenici Hall, New Mexico State University,
Las Cruces, NM, USA, 88003. (email: minghao@nmsu.edu).
b Department of Economics, and Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa
State University. (email: ebalistr@iastate.edu).
c Department of Economics, and Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa
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increased tariffs on large swathes of Chinese goods. China was able to retaliate
proportionally in early rounds but quickly ran out of U.S. exports to add tariffs
to, given its large bilateral trade surplus with the United States (Li, Zhang, and
Hart, 2018). As of the fall of 2019 more than 90% of products at the six-digit
Harmonized Code (HS) level have experienced tariff increases from one or both
countries. In addition, the United States is threatening to increase tariffs on cer-
tain consumer products and on $250 billion worth of Chinese exports that have
already been taxed in earlier rounds of tariff increases. Currently, there are signs
of a de-escalation. China offered to lift punitive tariffs on U.S. soybeans and pork
amid its ongoing African Swine Fever outbreak, and the United States also tem-
porarily exempted more than 400 Chinese products from tariffs and postponed
the implementation date on tariff rate hikes on $250 worth of Chinese exports
from October 1 2019 to October 15 2019.
General equilibrium simulation models are the standard tool for evaluating
the impacts of changes in trade barriers. In the last three decades, these meth-
ods have been applied to analyze important events in international trade such
as China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO, e.g. (Ianchovichina
and Martin, 2003)), the Uruguay (Francois, 2000; Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr,
1997) and Doha (Bouët, Mevel, and Orden, 2007) rounds of WTO negotiation,
the North America Free Trade Agreement Kehoe (2003), and regional economic
agreements (Kawasaki, 2015; Lee, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe, 2004;
Jugurnath, Stewart, and Brooks, 2007). Despite intense public attention on the
U.S.-China trade war, there are few comprehensive general equilibrium studies of
the of the resulting tariff increases. A barrier for conducting these analyses is that
the dispersed tariff disputes between the United States and its trade partners and
the repeated tariff increases between the United States and China have not been
processed for analysis. This study fills this gap by compiling a comprehensive
database on tariff increases, harmonizing them with the sectors in the recently
released Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 10 database, and evaluating them
using a widely accepted transparent structure. Our analysis provides the founda-
tion and reference point for future studies that might logically consider alternative
trade structures and validation exercises.
While this paper is the first comprehensive evaluation of the current U.S.-China
trade war, several preliminary studies exist. Balistreri et al. (2018) combine a
global CGE model and a regional CGE model of the United States and find that
the tariff increases up to the $50 billion round in August 2018 cost Iowa, a major
agricultural state in the United States, about 1% of Gross State Product. Using the
GTAP model, Carvalho, Azevedo, and Massuquetti (2019) find that tariff increases
in the $50 billion round decrease welfare by $39.7 billion to $43.1 billion for China
and $19.3 to $23.6 billion for the United States. Guo et al. (2018) use the Eaton
and Kortum (2002) model to evaluate a 45% tariff increase, proposed by then
presidential candidate Donald Trump, on all Chinese exports. In their scenarios
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where China retaliates with 45% tariff increases on U.S. exports, Guo et al. (2018)
find real wage changes by -0.37% to 0.08% in China and -0.75% to -0.32% in the
United States. Since these studies either only use tariff increases in earlier rounds
or use hypothetical tariff increases on all exports, their results cannot fully and
accurately capture the impacts of the trade war.
This paper first introduces a harmonized database (Li, 2019) of all tariff in-
creases in the recent trade disputes (which is made available for free download);
and, second, analyzes the impacts of these tariffs on welfare, sectoral output, and
trade patterns. We investigate the tariff changes within the established canonical
Lanz and Rutherford (2016) GTAPinGAMS model calibrated to the GTAP version
10 accounts. Using this off-the-shelf model provides a transparent reference point
for evaluating the tariff data under a generic neoclassical economic structure.
First, we find that under the accumulated tariffs implemented as of September
2019, China’s welfare falls by 1.9% while U.S. welfare falls by 0.3%. Second, the
tariffs have substantial effects on the output of targeted sectors as well as related
sectors. Third, China’s export to and import from the U.S. will be reduced by
58.3% and 50.7% respectively under the accumulated tariffs as of September 2019.
There is significant trade diversion as China increases its penetration into the
markets in the EU, Canada, and Mexico, resulting in modest decreases in overall
import and export for both countries. These results are robust to a wide ranges
of trade elasticities (i.e. Armington elasticities).1 For China and the United States,
the magnitudes of welfare loss from the trade war are comparable to welfare gains
from China’s WTO accession, the Uruguay round of WTO negotiation, and even
global free trade.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II offers a description of
the model and describe the tariff database. Section III presents results on overall
welfare, industry output value, and trade flows. Section IV discusses the limi-
tation of the GTAPinGAMS model and discuss findings in the context of other
important events in international trade.
2. Method
2.1 The canonical GTAPinGAMS model and scenarios
The GTAPinGAMS model (Lanz and Rutherford, 2016) is a Computable Gen-
eral Equilibrium (CGE) model which we calibrate to the recently released GTAP 10
database. The model structure is developed and documented by Aguiar, Narayanan,
and McDougall (2016). This model adopts a particular trade structure consistent
with the Armington (1969) assumption—goods under a given commodity classi-
1 Current observed trade responses are not as large as the model indicates. This likely
reflects sluggish responses and perhaps expectations of a pending resolution in the short-
run. The trade elasticites in the GTAP model are generally interpreted as medium to
long-run responses.
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fication from different countries are treated as imperfect substitutes. The Arming-
ton elasticities of substitution are the most crucial parameters for assessing trade
responses (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2003). Besides the main results, we conduct
sensitivity analyses using one and two standard deviations around the original
estimates adopted in GTAP, which come from Hertel et al. (2007).
We maintain the 57 sectors in the GTAP 10 database but aggregate the 140
GTAP countries and regions to 22. In particular, countries in the EU are aggre-
gated into one region. The United States and countries that are among the top 20
steel and aluminum exporters to the United States (if not in the EU) are maintained
as individual countries. Leading trade partners of China and the United States are
among these countries. Other countries are aggregated to a rest-of-world (ROW)
region. We solve the global multi-regional version of the GTAPinGAMS model as
otherwise parameterized in Lanz and Rutherford (2016).
2.2 Tariff increases and scenarios
In March 2018, the United States increased tariffs on aluminum and steel by
10% and 15% respectively. Canada, China, the European Union (EU), India, Mex-
ico, and Turkey each retaliated with proportional tariff increases on U.S. goods.
In May 2019, agreements were reached between the United States and Canada
and Mexico to end U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum and the retaliatory tariffs
from Canada and Mexico. In June and August of 2018, the United States imposed
25% additional duty on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports related to China’s
”Made in China 2025” industrial policy. China responded with 25% additional
tariffs on the same amount of U.S. products, notably agricultural products such as
soybeans.
In September 2018, the United Stated raised tariffs by 10% on $200 billion worth
of products from China and China retaliated with 5% to 10% tariffs on $60 billion
worth of products from the United States. After the negotiation between China
and the United States broke down, the 10% tariffs applied by the United States on
$200 billion Chinese goods increased to 25% in June 2019, and China’s tariffs on
$60 billion U.S. exports increased to 5% to 25%. In September 2019, the United
States increased tariffs by 15% on the first batch of products from a list of $300
billion Chinese exports and China responded by increasing tariffs on the first
batch of products from a list of $75 billion U.S exports.
As of the writing of this article, the U.S. tariff on the second batch of $300
billion Chinese exports and China’s retaliation are scheduled to go into effect on
December 15, 2019. Furthermore, the United Stated is threatening to increase
tariffs on $250 billion worth of Chinese exports, including those taxed in the $50
billion round and the $200 billion round, from 25% to 30% on October 15, 2019.
We construct three scenarios with different tariff increases:
Scenario 1: Steel-aluminum Tariff increases due to the U.S. steel and alu-
minum tariffs and retaliatory tariffs from China, the EU, India, and Turkey.
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U.S. tariffs on Mexico and Canada, and corresponding retaliatory tariffs
have been removed, reflecting the results of later negotiations.
Scenario 2: September 2019 Tariff increases in scenario 1 and additional
tariff increases between the United States and China, including the $50
billion round, the $200 billion/$60 billion round, and the first wave of the
$300/$75 billion round tariff increases. This is the scenario that captures
the current tariffs imposed by China and U.S.
Scenario 3: December 2019 tariffs Cumulative tariff increases in scenario
1 and 2, and scheduled tariff increases on $250 billion Chinese products
from 25% to 30% , and the second wave of the $300/$75 billion round
tariffs. This represents all implemented tariff increases and announced
threats between the United States and China.2
2.3 Data processing
Tariff increases listed above are collected from original government announce-
ments. The raw tariff increases, mostly at the eight-digit HS code level, are aggre-
gated to the six-digit HS code level by simple averaging. Six-digits HS products
are assigned to GTAP sectors using a crosswalk from 2012 HS code to 2007 HS
code, then from the 2007 HS code to GTAP sectors. GTAP-sectors-level Tariff in-
creases are calculated as the trade-value-weighted average of six-digits HS level
tariff increases. The trade value are based on 2016 values from the UN Comtrade
database. For consistency, we use values reported by the United States for all
trade flows. Original tariff increase data, six-digits HS level data, GTAP-sectors-
level data, documents and data processing codes are freely available for download
(Li, 2019).
3. Results
3.1 Trade-weighted tariff increases
We first report, in Table 1, the trade-weighted cumulative tariff increases in dif-
ferent rounds of trade disputes. The tariff lists of both countries contain products
with little trade volume, highlighting the importance of using trade-weighted tar-
iff increases. The trade-weighted average U.S. tariff increase on Chinese exports is
about 21.7% by the September 2019 and by 30.5% by December 2019. The corre-
sponding Chinese retaliations increase trade weighted tariffs by 20.7% by Septem-
ber 2019 and by 24.0% by December 2019. By December 2019, China’s retaliation
will be lower than the U.S. tariffs both in trade weighted tariff increase and in the
2 China’s retaliations for the $250 billion tariffs has not been announced yet and are not
included. Also China recently exempted tariffs on selected products including soybeans
and pork, and the United States also exempted about 400 types of Chinese products. Since
these exemptions are highly dependent on the results of the upcoming trade talk, they are
not included.
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amount of trade affected.
For important Chinese products with more than 5% share of China-U.S. export,
”Other Machinery and Equipments” took the hardest hit (33.7% trade-weighted
tariff increase), followed by ”Lumber” (20.6%), and ”Electronic Equipment” (18.8%).
If the threat of additional tariffs on $300 billion Chinese goods were to be imple-
mented, tariffs on important Chinese exports to the United States will be above
25% across the board except for ”Other manufacturing”, with tariffs on ”Other
Machinery and Equipments” and ”Electronic Equipment” raised to as high as
42.0% and 30.4%. Among important U.S. exports to China with more than 5%
export share, ”Motor vehicles and parts”, ”Oil seeds (Soybeans)”, and ”Other ma-
chinery and equipments” experience the highest tariff increases after the Septem-
ber 2019 round. Notably, China’s tariff increases on intermediate industrial inputs
(e.g. ”Chemical Rubber Products” and ”Forestry”) are modest, possibly reflecting
China’s dependence on certain inputs from the United States. In China’s retali-
ation by December 2019, ”motor vehicles and parts” from the United States will
see a 9.1% tariff increase from scenario 2.
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Table 1. Trade-weighted tariff increases (%)
Ecn,us
US tariffs on China Eus,cn
China’s tariffs on US
Sep. 2019 Dec. 2019 Sep. 2019 Dec. 2019
Other Machinery & Equipment 21.5 33.7 42.0 19.0 14.5 18.0
Chemical Rubber Products 8.6 18.7 25.7 16.9 12.5 13.3
Motor vehicles and parts 2.7 24.0 28.8 14.3 34.2 43.3
Oil Seeds 0.0 25.0 30.0 12.3 33.1 33.2
Electronic Equipment 30.1 18.8 30.4 9.1 11.8 14.2
Forestry 0.0 24.3 27.8 4.5 6.5 9.0
Paper & Paper Products 1.2 20.9 26.8 3.7 15.3 19.7
Non-Ferrous Metals 0.5 25.0 26.8 3.1 29.8 34.3
Lumber 6.0 21.6 28.1 2.3 20.0 23.0
Other Food 1.3 26.3 30.8 1.8 27.8 30.0
Petroleum & Coke 0.2 46.7 55.5 1.7 25.9 28.4
Other Animal Products 0.1 31.8 36.3 1.0 22.7 26.1
Other Mining 0.1 24.9 29.8 1.0 20.2 20.5
Other Grains 0.0 25.0 30.0 1.0 24.9 34.9
Iron & Steel 0.4 32.6 35.0 0.9 23.4 23.8
Fabricated Metal Products 3.8 22.3 29.7 0.8 16.8 20.9
Beverages and Tobacco products 0.0 12.9 18.6 0.8 29.9 34.3
Textiles 4.3 15.6 24.5 0.7 12.2 14.7
Non-Metallic Minerals 1.6 19.4 26.3 0.6 14.9 17.7
Other Crops 0.1 23.6 26.6 0.6 22.2 29.1
Other Manufacturing 7.2 7.1 18.9 0.6 16.5 22.2
Other Meat 0.0 35.6 40.6 0.6 54.5 54.9
Plant Fibres 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.5 25.0 30.0
Veritable & Fruit 0.2 29.5 39.1 0.4 48.6 48.6
Leather 4.6 18.1 28.2 0.4 20.4 24.3
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Oil 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.3 5.0 5.0
Milk 0.0 15.6 15.8 0.3 23.5 24.5
Fishing 0.0 23.3 27.8 0.2 1.6 1.6
Wheat 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.2 24.3 34.3
Vegetable Oils 0.0 22.2 25.7 0.1 23.3 30.8
Gas 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.1 25.0 25.0
Coal 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.1 29.9 29.9
Other Transport Equipment 0.8 23.4 28.1 0.1 16.9 19.4
Wearing Apparel 4.9 16.4 19.2 0.1 24.7 25.6
Cattle 0.0 22.9 26.9 0.0 0.1 0.1
Wool 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 24.6 24.6
Cattle Meat 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 23.5 23.5
Sugar 0.0 33.7 37.5 0.0 11.4 11.4
Gas Distribution 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 25.0 25.0
Processed Rice 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 25.0 25.0
Cane & Beet 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 30.0 37.5
Paddy Rice 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 25.0 25.0
Electricity 0.0 25.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Weighted Average 0.0 21.7 30.5 0.0 20.7 24.0
Total Value of Exports ($billion) 495.0 117.0
Note: The tariff increases are from the trade war database by Li (2019). Ecn,us represents the sector’s
share in Chinese exports to the United States. Eus,cn represents the sector’s share in U.S. exports to
China. Trade flows are based on 2016 data reported by the United States from the UN Comtrade
database. In 2016, total export to the world is $2,097 billion for China (reported by China) and
$1,450 billion for the U.S. (reported by the U.S.). Items in the table are ranked by their shares in
China’s export to the United States
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3.2 Welfare
This section reports percentage changes in overall welfare across countries (Fig-
ure 1), for the three scenarios. Welfare calculations are based on equivalent vari-
ation. Overall, the steel and aluminum tariffs have minor effects on welfare com-
pared to the trade disputes between the United States and China. With the ac-
cumulated tariffs as of September 2019 (scenario 2), welfare in the United States
decreases by 0.3% and welfare in China decreases by 1.9%. Accumulated tariffs
as of December 2019 (scenario 3) further increase China’s welfare loss to 2.3% and
U.S. welfare loss to 0.4%. Most other countries and regions, especially major ex-
porters of manufactured goods to the United States, gain from the trade disputes
between the United States and China. Viet Nam, Mexico, and Qatar, gaining 1.2%,
0.83%, and 0.69% of welfare respectively under scenario 2, are the largest winners
in the U.S.-China trade war.
Given the scale of the trade distortion, the estimated welfare impacts seems
modest. One reason is that the sizable tariffs are limited to U.S.-China trade.
Trade diversion to and from other countries substantially offsets the impacts. The
results are also consistent with high optimal tariffs—a well known suspicious fea-
ture of Armington models.3 The tariff increases generate beneficial terms-of-trade
impacts that help to offset the adverse welfare impacts. Error bars are included in
Figure 1 to illustrate the range of results when we increase and decrease the trade
elasticities by two standard deviations (as reported in their original estimation
(Hertel et al., 2007)). Deviations from the central trade elasticities has little impact
on the welfare impacts, but does play a role in the sectoral responses reported
below.
3.3 Sectoral Impacts in the United States and China
While welfare change is essential for aggregate policy decisions, there are
important distributional impacts that cleave with import-competing and exporting
sectors. In this section, we present changes in revenue by sector. Figures 2 and 3
present the major sectoral impacts for the United States and China. The first-order
effect of a tariff increase is to depress revenue in exporting sectors and increase
revenue in import-competing sectors that are targeted. These impacts explain the
revenue growth of the U.S. iron and steel sector under scenario 1 (Figure 2). It can
also explain the decline in the U.S. oilseed sector (largely soybeans). In scenarios
2 and 3 sizeable tariffs on Chinese electronic products support the U.S. electronic
equipment sector. For China, the electronic equipment sector suffers significantly
3 See Brown (1987), Balistreri and Markusen (2009), and Balistreri and Rutherford (2013)
for a critiques of the Armington structure and implied optimal tariffs. In fact, for China
Balistreri and Rutherford (2013) show that the qualitative welfare impact of a marginal
move away from observed tariffs is sensitive to the particular trade structure: Armington
(1969) versus Melitz (2003).
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under these barriers. We present the results in both percentage and absolute
change ($Billion) to reveal the importance of the trade dispute to the individual
sector and the economy as a whole. For example, in scenario 2, the revenue of
the U.S. oilseed sector declines by over 19.4% or $8.3 Billion, and the revenue of
the Chinese electronic equipment sector declines by 3.1%, which is a loss of more
than $72.1 Billion.
We also highlight second-order effects that operate through upstream and
downstream sectors. For example, in the United States the transport equipment
(other than cars and truck) sector suffers a loss from the steel and aluminum tar-
iffs due to higher input costs, and the service sectors like the retail and wholesale
trade sector in the United States and China suffer significant revenue reductions.
10
Figure 1. Welfare impacts across regions (% change)
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Table 2. Change in the pattern of international trade (%)
Importer Total
Exporter Scenario U.S. China EU Canada Mexico Others Exports
Steel-aluminum -1.6 -2.0 -3.0 0.3 0.4 -0.9
U.S. September 2019 -50.7 -2.7 -3.1 -1.2 -1.1 -6.4
December 2019 -54.9 -3.1 -3.3 -1.4 -1.8 -7.2
Steel-aluminum -0.5 0.4 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
China September 2019 -58.3 9.0 11.7 12.2 7.2 -4.4
December 2019 -72.5 11.3 14.7 15.6 9.1 -5.4
Steel-aluminum -0.9 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.2
EU September 2019 6.9 -0.3 -0.2 2.3 1.8 -0.9 0.2
December 2019 9.4 -1.1 -0.4 2.5 2.2 -1.2 0.2
Steel-aluminum -1.8 0.8 1.0 -0.2 0.7 -0.9
Canada September 2019 1.1 1.6 -1.7 -0.1 -2.3 0.3
December 2019 1.9 0.5 -2.4 -0.4 -3.0 0.5
Steel-aluminum 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.2
Mexico September 2019 6.5 -6.2 -6.4 -6.3 -7.8 2.4
December 2019 8.5 -8.5 -8.4 -8.4 -10.0 3.1
Steel-aluminum -0.4 0.3 0.3 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.2
Others September 2019 9.5 -0.9 -0.3 1.9 2.0 -0.9 0.5
December 2019 12.6 -1.7 -0.5 2.0 2.4 -1.2 0.5
Steel-aluminum -0.7 0.1 0.2 -0.8 0.2 0.2
Total September 2019 -4.6 -5.3 0.2 0.2 2.1 0.4
Import December 2019 -5.2 -6.4 0.1 0.3 2.8 0.4
1
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3.4 The pattern of trade
In Table 2 we report the percent change in trade flows. Major shifts in trade
patterns are mostly focused on the United States and China. With cumulative
tariff increase as of September 2019 tariffs, exports from China to the United States
fall by 58.3%, and exports from the United States to China fall by 50.7%. 4 We
show significant trade diversion as total Chinese exports fall by only 5.3%, with
major penetration into the EU (+9.0%), Canadian (11.7%), and Mexican (12.2%)
markets. While the U.S. intent is to promote exports the trade disruptions have
the opposite effect. It is notable that U.S. exports fall to each of the major trading
partners (China, the EU, Canada, and Mexico).5 Overall, U.S. exports fall by 6.4%
under the tariffs accumulated as of September 2019. With the threaten tariffs in
scenario 3, exports from China to the United States will decrease by 72.5%.
4. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper introduces a data source for the tariff increases resulting from the
recent trade disputes and documents the impacts of these tariffs using a standard
off-the-shelf general-equilibrium simulation model. We find modest impacts on
overall welfare, but large impacts on sectoral revenue and the pattern of interna-
tional trade.
The welfare impacts estimated by this study (-1.9% for China and -0.3% for the
United States by September 2019) are comparable to those of previous significant
trade events. For example, the welfare impacts of China’s WTO accession is esti-
mated to be 1.24% by Li and Zhai (2000) and 2.2% by Ianchovichina and Martin
(2003). Similarly, for China’s WTO accession, Chen and Ravallion (2004) estimated
a 1.5% increase in China’s mean income, and Wang (2003) estimated a 2.9% in-
crease in China’s cumulative GDP by 2010. For other major trade agreements,
papers reviewed by Francois (2000) find the WTO agreements in the Uruguay
round increase China’s welfare by -0.2% to 1.7%, and U.S. welfare by 0.1% to
0.9%. Ballard and Cheong (1997) estimated that the establishment of a Pacific free
trade area including China and the United States would increase China’s welfare
by 1.4% and U.S. welfare by 0.13%. Results from this paper demonstrate that the
U.S.-China trade war is among the most significant trade events in recent history.
Key limitations of the GTAPinGAMS model that we employ include paramet-
ric and structural uncertainty. In order to look at some preliminary paramet-
ric sensitivities we present results based on the econometric standard errors on
4 With low (high) Armington elasticities, China’s exports to the United States fall by 56.3%
(60.1%) and exports from the United States to China fall by 46.7% (53.8%).
5 Our analysis does not currently consider the renegotiated NAFTA, also known as the
United-States- Mexico-Canada Agreement. However, since the new NAFTA largely main-
tains tariff-free trade in most goods, we expect it to have little impact at the aggregate
level.
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the elasticities of substitution between regional varieties (the trade elasticities).
We leave an exploration of structural sensitivity for future research. Significant
progress has been made in the adoption of advanced trade structures in a com-
putational setting. In fact, the recent work of Balistreri and Tarr (2018), Costinot
and Rodrı́guez-Clare (2014), and Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) sug-
gests considerable differences across models that consider trade induced variety
and productivity adjustments. Our intention is to encourage this analysis by es-
tablishing a transparent reference point for more elaborate empirical simulation
environments. We are also hopeful that the compiled database for the U.S.-China
trade war will facilitate these and other future applications.
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